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FOREIGN LAW AND THE DENOMINATOR PROBLEM 
Ernest A. Young∗ 
Before Roper v. Simmons,1 American states split thirty to twenty 
on the legitimacy of the juvenile death penalty.  On the international 
plane, however, the United States stood alone in condoning the prac-
tice.2  The question is the appropriate significance of the latter fact for 
American constitutional doctrine.  Although this issue falls within a 
much broader debate over references to foreign law by American 
courts,3 I want to focus on the narrow question that arises when such 
law is used to bolster claims of “consensus” against (or in favor of) a 
particular practice. 
The Court’s jurisprudence of “cruel and unusual” punishments has 
both objective morality and practice components.4  The latter deter-
mines whether a consensus rejects a challenged practice by canvassing 
the practices of other relevant jurisdictions.5  Such an inquiry requires 
choices about which other jurisdictions are relevant.  One might envi-
sion this universe of relevant jurisdictions as the denominator of a 
fraction, with the jurisdictions actually pursuing the challenged prac-
tice supplying the numerator.  If the numerator is small relative to the 
denominator then the Court will condemn the practice as an outlier, 
out of step with “evolving standards of decency.”6 
Roper’s “denominator problem” concerned whether foreign jurisdic-
tions should count in Eighth Amendment cases.7  Justice Kennedy’s 
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 1 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005). 
 2 Id. at 1198. 
 3 See, e.g., Agora: The United States Constitution and International Law, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 
42 (2004) (articles by T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Roger P. Alford, Harold Hongju Koh, Gerald L. 
Neuman, and Michael D. Ramsey). 
 4 See, e.g., Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1192; Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002). 
 5 See, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370–71 (1989) (finding no consensus against 
the death penalty for sixteen-year-olds because twenty-two out of thirty-seven death penalty states 
permitted it). 
 6 Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1190 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opin-
ion)). 
 7 This was not the only “denominator problem” in Roper.  A second concerned whether to 
include American states that had abolished the death penalty entirely.  Compare id. at 1192 (“30 
States prohibit the juvenile death penalty, comprising 12 that have rejected the death penalty al-
together and 18 that maintain it but . . . exclude juveniles from its reach.”), with id. at 1219 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Consulting States that bar the death penalty concerning the necessity of 
making an exception to the death penalty for offenders under 18 is rather like including old-order 
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claim that a domestic consensus rejected the juvenile death penalty 
was profoundly implausible given that twenty states retained the prac-
tice.8  But by shifting focus from the domestic to the international 
plane — where the United States stood as one jurisdiction against all 
the rest — the Roper majority made an implausible claim of “consen-
sus” into a plausible one.  Defenders of looking to foreign law typically 
describe that practice as a search for “persuasive authority” — an at-
tempt, in Justice Breyer’s words, to “learn something” from a “judge in 
a different country dealing with a similar problem.”9  I argue here, 
however, that creating consensus by including foreign jurisdictions in 
the Eighth Amendment denominator goes considerably further and, in 
fact, gives the practices of those jurisdictions authoritative legal 
weight. 
I have two objectives in this brief Comment.  The first is to clarify 
how foreign law is used in cases like Roper and, consequently, the 
stakes in the debate over sources.  The second is to sketch some cau-
tions about expanding the denominator in such cases, although space 
will not permit much elaboration of these normative claims. 
I.  FOREIGN LAW’S INFLUENCE 
The Supreme Court’s use of foreign law in constitutional interpre-
tation is hardly new.10  Neither is political opposition to foreign legal 
influence.11  This longstanding debate would benefit, however, from a 
more systematic effort to distinguish the different ways the Court has 
used foreign law.  Such law may apply of its own force,12 or domestic 
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Amishmen in a consumer-preference poll on the electric car.”).  Excluding such jurisdictions 
would also exclude many of the foreign jurisdictions cited in Roper. 
 8 The Court also emphasized that few of the jurisdictions that retained the juvenile death 
penalty on the books had actually executed anyone recently for a crime committed as a juvenile.  
Id. at 1192 (majority opinion).  I discuss this argument infra p. 165. 
 9 Justices Antonin Scalia & Stephen Breyer, Discussion at the American University Washing-
ton College of Law: Constitutional Relevance of Foreign Court Decisions (Jan. 13, 2005) (tran-
script available at http://domino.american.edu/AU/media/mediarel.nsf/0/1F2F7DC4757FD01E852 
56F890068E6E0?OpenDocument). 
 10 See Sarah H. Cleveland, Our International Constitution, 31 YALE J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 
2005).  But see Eugene Kontorovich, Disrespecting the “Opinions of Mankind”: International Law 
in Constitutional Interpretation, 8 GREEN BAG 2D 261 (2005) (demonstrating that international-
ists’ invocation of the Declaration of Independence as support for foreign influence on constitu-
tional interpretation is misplaced). 
 11 In the early Republic, for example, several states enacted statutes forbidding their courts 
even to cite to English common law decisions.  See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 135 
n.32 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing against interpreting the Eleventh Amendment in ac-
cord with English common law notions of sovereign immunity).  James Madison was one of many 
who inveighed against the tyrannical influence of English law.  See id. at 139–42. 
 12 The Court’s immigration cases, for instance, have derived Congress’s power over immigra-
tion from international law principles of sovereignty rather than from any enumerated power in 
Article I.  See, e.g., Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889); Sarah H. Cleve-
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legal rules may incorporate foreign law in various ways.13  Roper and 
similar cases — most prominently, Atkins v. Virginia14 and Lawrence v. 
Texas15 — invoked foreign principles to influence the interpretation of 
wholly domestic legal provisions.16 
Within the category of influence, one may further distinguish be-
tween looking to foreign law to prove or disprove certain factual 
propositions and looking abroad for normative guidance.  Washington 
v. Glucksberg,17 for example, looked to Dutch experience with physi-
cian-assisted suicide to ascertain whether recognizing that practice as a 
fundamental right might encourage related forms of euthanasia or un-
dermine medical ethics.  Use of foreign experience to resolve factual 
disputes like this is relatively (but not completely) uncontroversial.18  
Roper, however, did not look to foreign experience to assess the conse-
quences of abandoning the juvenile death penalty in the United States.  
Rather, the Court used foreign law to “confirm” a proposition of value, 
that is, “that the death penalty is disproportionate punishment for of-
fenders under 18.”19 
Normative influence comes in at least two flavors.  Those Justices 
who believe in foreign citation have typically defended it as a form of 
persuasive authority: American judges look abroad for different or in-
novative ways of approaching common issues, but the foreign law has 
no force beyond the persuasiveness of its reasoning.  When a court 
takes account of foreign legal practice as part of a search for “consen-
sus,” by contrast, it typically looks to the mere fact of the foreign juris-
diction’s position on a particular issue.  The process is one of counting 
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land, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth Century 
Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1, 130–32 (2002). 
 13 In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2761–62 (2004), the Court recognized a federal 
common law cause of action, associated with the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000), to 
redress certain violations of customary international law.  See also Torture Victim Protection Act 
of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, § 3(b), 106 Stat. 73, 73–74 (1992) (incorporating the customary in-
ternational law definition of torture).  More prosaically, domestic choice of law rules may call for 
the application of foreign law.  See, e.g., Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 592 (1953). 
 14 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
 15 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003). 
 16 Some of the amici in Roper insisted that the prohibition of the juvenile death penalty is a 
jus cogens norm that controls the interpretation of the Eighth Amendment.  See Brief for the 
Human Rights Committee of the Bar of England and Wales, et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondent at 23–24, Roper (No. 03-633).  I would be surprised to see many domestic lawyers 
take that contention seriously. 
 17 521 U.S. 702, 734 (1997). 
 18 At their recent public debate on the use of foreign law, for example, Justices Scalia and 
Breyer seemed to agree on the propriety of using foreign examples to resolve factual disputes.  See 
Scalia & Breyer, supra note 9.  I raise some concerns in infra section II.C, pp. 165–67. 
 19 Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1198. 
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noses, with little regard to the reasons that led to the adoption or rejec-
tion of a practice in any particular jurisdiction.20 
I argue in the next two sections that the Supreme Court’s practice 
in Roper and similar cases has considerably more to do with nose 
counting than with assessing the reasons underlying a particular for-
eign practice.  I want to stress that including foreign jurisdictions in 
the denominator of noses that count accords authoritative weight to 
their choices.  In this situation, those choices — for example, to adopt 
or reject the juvenile death penalty — have legal significance without 
regard to the reasons for the choice.  When a legal rule has force 
whether or not we agree with the reasons used to justify it, is that not 
the very definition of binding legal authority?21 
A.  Persuasive Authority 
The Justices who support foreign citation have often downplayed 
its importance.  Justice Ginsburg argued recently that the issue is sim-
ply one of “sharing with and learning from others.”22  For Justice 
Breyer, the “enormous value” of “the similar experience of others” 
springs from the fact that “[j]udges in different countries increasingly 
apply somewhat similar legal phrases to somewhat similar circum-
stances, for example with respect to multiracial populations, growing 
immigration, economic demands, environmental concerns, modern 
technologies, and instantaneous media communication.”23  And Justice 
O’Connor recently insisted that public criticism of the Court’s use of 
foreign law is “much ado about nothing. . . . [I]t doesn’t hurt to be 
aware of what other countries are doing.”24 
It seems positively anti-intellectual and hubristic to say that we  
can learn nothing from foreign jurisdictions, and this fact probably  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 20 See Vicki C. Jackson, Narratives of Federalism: Of Continuities and Comparative Constitu-
tional Experience, 51 DUKE L.J. 223, 250 (2001) (distinguishing between the influence of constitu-
tional reasoning and constitutional practices of other nations). 
 21 See JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 3–27 (1979); JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY 
OF FREEDOM 35 (1986); see also JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 84 (1999) 
(observing that Raz’s conception of authority is “standardly accepted among legal philosophers at 
the moment”). 
 22 Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks to the American Society of International Law: “A 
Decent Respect to the Opinions of [Human]kind”: The Value of a Comparative Perspective in 
Constitutional Adjudication (Apr. 1, 2005) (transcript available at http://www.asil.org/events/ 
AM05/ginsburg050401.html). 
 23 Stephen Breyer, Keynote Address, 97 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 265, 266 (2003). 
 24 Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, Remarks at the National Constitution Center et al. Constitu-
tional Conversation (Apr. 21, 2005) (transcript available at LEXIS, News Library, Fednew file); 
see also Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, Remarks to the Southern Center for International Studies 
1–2 (Oct. 28, 2003) [hereinafter O’Connor, 2003 Remarks] (transcript available at http:// 
www.southerncenter.org/OConnor_transcript.pdf) (arguing that “conclusions reached by other 
countries and by the international community, although not formally binding upon our decisions, 
should at times constitute persuasive authority in American courts”). 
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accounts for the broad support for foreign citation in the academy.25  
Roper, however, does not read like a case in which the Court looked 
abroad hoping to “learn something.”  The hallmark of persuasive au-
thority is engagement with the reasons for a practice or a decision 
rather than the counting of noses.  There is no imperative to choose 
the most widespread practice or rule, for example, if the minority posi-
tion seems better thought out.  But Justice Kennedy’s discussion of 
foreign law is all about noses, not reasons.  It begins with “the stark 
reality that the United States is the only country in the world that con-
tinues to give official sanction to the juvenile death penalty”;26 invokes 
the prohibition of this punishment in the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child,27 “which every country in the world has ratified save for the 
United States and Somalia,” and to which “[n]o ratifying country has 
entered a reservation” on juvenile death;28 and observes that “only 
seven countries other than the United States have executed juvenile 
offenders since 1990.”29  The only country discussed in any detail is the 
United Kingdom.  Again, the point is simply the fact of abolition; no 
inquiry is made into why the United Kingdom might have taken such 
a step.  Only at the end is there a conclusory statement that this uni-
versal disavowal of the juvenile death penalty has “rest[ed] in large 
part on the understanding that the instability and emotional imbalance 
of young people may often be a factor in the crime.”30  That under-
standing, of course, mirrors precisely the judgment that the Court had 
already reached in its “independent” evaluation of the morality of the 
penalty.  So what did we “learn,” exactly? 
This lack of interest in the reasons underlying foreign practice is 
characteristic of the Court’s employment of foreign law.31  In Atkins, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 25 For example, Sanford Levinson refers to Justice Scalia’s “embarrassing” “militant provin-
cialism.”  Sanford Levinson, Looking Abroad When Interpreting the U.S. Constitution: Some Re-
flections, 39 TEX. INT’L L.J. 353, 358 (2004).  Professor Levinson ends up agreeing with much of 
Justice Scalia’s critique, but it obviously pains him greatly to do so.  For my own effort to “learn 
something” from foreign law, see Ernest A. Young, Protecting Member State Autonomy in the 
European Union: Some Cautionary Tales from American Federalism, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1612, 
1730–35 (2002), which discusses the relevance of European law to questions of American federal-
ism. 
 26 Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1198. 
 27 Adopted Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 28 Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1199. 
 29 Id.  Even worse, the United States’s seven colleagues in this practice are the presumably 
benighted realms of Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, and China.  And even these countries have since (said that they have) abolished the prac-
tice.  See id. 
 30 Id. at 1200. 
 31 See Jackson, supra note 20, at 251 (noting that “the United States Supreme Court differs 
markedly from many other constitutional courts, which not only manifest awareness of the consti-
tutional practices of other nations, but also cite and consider the reasoning of foreign constitu-
tional courts’ decisions”). 
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the Court cited the practice of foreign jurisdictions without examining 
the whys and wherefores underlying those practices.32  Likewise, in 
Lawrence, the Court merely noted the fact that the European Court of 
Human Rights had struck down an antisodomy law without examin-
ing the reasoning in the European court’s opinion.33  One might tell-
ingly contrast the Court’s practice with that of the South African Con-
stitutional Court, for example, which engages in extensive analyses of 
the reasoning of foreign practice.34 
I submit that the Court’s neglect of the reasoning behind foreign 
practices is not simply sloppy opinion writing.  The Justices are not 
searching foreign court opinions for innovative doctrinal formulae or 
new arguments not found in the American discourse (even though we 
might well find such if we looked).  There is none of Vicki Jackson’s 
“engagement” with the foreign sources in Roper, nor did the Court use 
foreign law as a repository of common wisdom in the manner of Jer-
emy Waldron’s “ius gentium.”35  Rather, it is precisely the fact of for-
eign practice that is most relevant for the Court’s analysis.  The Roper 
Court’s method thus was not simply an effort to approximate some 
form of persuasive influence that fell a little short in terms of analyti-
cal rigor.  It was a different method, with an entirely different focus. 
B.  Nose-Counting Authority 
Decisions like Roper cite foreign law in order to corroborate the 
impression that the domestic practice under attack is an outlier, con-
trary to contemporary conceptions of morality.  The practice compo-
nent of the Court’s inquiry asks how many jurisdictions continue to 
execute people for acts committed as juveniles, expressed as a fraction 
of the relevant jurisdictions overall.  Including foreign practice shifts 
the question from whether places like Texas and Missouri — states 
maintaining the juvenile death penalty — are unusual out of the fifty-
one American jurisdictions, to whether those states are unusual con-
sidered against the world as a whole (or perhaps some subset of coun-
tries with values similar to our own).  The foreign jurisdictions, in 
other words, swell the denominator against which the set of jurisdic-
tions retaining the benighted practice is measured. 
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 32 See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317 n.21 (2002). 
 33 See Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2481 (2003). 
 34 See, e.g., Minister of Fin. v Van Heerden 2004 (11) BCLR 1125 (CC) at 1138–39 (S. Afr.) 
(considering, and rejecting, the rationale of American decisions on racial discrimination). 
 35 See Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term—Comment: Constitutional Compari-
sons: Convergence, Resistance, Engagement, 119 HARV. L. REV. 109 (2005); Jeremy Waldron, The 
Supreme Court, 2004 Term—Comment: Foreign Law and the Modern Ius Gentium, 119 HARV. L. 
REV. 129 (2005). 
154 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 119:148  
The point of swelling the denominator is that it is not big enough 
without these foreign practices.  Justice Kennedy sought “evidence of 
national consensus against the death penalty for juveniles,”36 but what 
he found was a nation deeply divided on the question.  Twenty states 
retained the practice, while thirty had abolished it.37  The retaining 
states represented 123,438,384 persons, out of a national population of 
293,655,404, or over forty-two percent of the nation.38  Such an even 
split hardly fits the common understanding of “consensus” as “[g]eneral 
agreement or concord” or “the collective unanimous opinion of a num-
ber of persons.”39  This substantial minority position on the domestic 
plane becomes an aberrational practice, however, when judged against 
the backdrop of world opinion.  Used in this way, foreign legal rules 
become dispositive of domestic law; without them, after all, there 
would be insufficient “consensus” to void state practice.  So far, the 
Court has only used foreign practice to resolve an ambiguous domestic 
picture.  But at least in theory, “extending the sphere” to the rest of the 
world could turn even a practice of a solid majority of states into an 
eccentric outlier.40 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Roper purported to accord a more 
limited role to foreign law; such law, he said, “provide[s] respected and 
significant confirmation for our own conclusions.”41  It is unclear ex-
actly what “confirm” means in this context.  Would a domestic conclu-
sion that is not confirmed by foreign practice be insufficient to strike 
down a state law?  If not, then what work is foreign practice doing in 
the opinion?  Some foreign citations are no doubt purely ornamental, 
or perhaps meant as a “shout out” to express the Court’s respect for 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 36 Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1192. 
 37 See id.  The retaining states were Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, 
Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, 
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, and Virginia.  This count elides the diffi-
cult question of whether to count states that have abolished the death penalty altogether.  See su-
pra note 7. 
 38 These figures reflect estimated populations as of July 1, 2004.  See POPULATION DIV., U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU, ANNUAL ESTIMATES OF THE POPULATION FOR THE UNITED STATES 
AND STATES, AND FOR PUERTO RICO: APRIL 1, 2000 TO JULY 1, 2004 (2004), http:// 
www.census.gov/popest/states/tables/NST-EST2004-01.pdf.  Of course, one can hardly assume 
that every person within a state retaining the juvenile death penalty agrees with that decision — 
but one cannot assume that every person within a state that has abolished it agrees with that de-
cision either. 
 39 3 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 760 (2d ed. 1989). 
 40 The parallel to Madison’s The Federalist No. 10 should be obvious.  The point of geo-
graphic scale in that essay was to prevent majority tyranny by turning local majorities into na-
tional minorities.  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 83–84 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter 
ed., 1961). 
 41 Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1200. 
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foreign opinion or to enhance the prestige of the cited court.42  But 
there are several reasons to take the Court’s “confirmatory” discussion 
seriously: the extensiveness of Justice Kennedy’s foreign law discussion 
and his description of its influence as “significant and respected”; the 
exceptionally weak evidence of domestic consensus and the Court’s 
close division on the objective morality component; and the willingness 
of several Justices, in their extrajudicial statements, to defend and 
promote the practice of looking to foreign law.43  In any event, it seems 
best forthrightly to debate the legitimacy of foreign citation before the 
significance of such citations is firmly established.44 
One should not overstate the difference between persuasive and 
nose-counting authority.  The most appealing account of the consensus 
test is that the Court looks to practice — both domestic and foreign — 
to confirm its own intuitions out of an appropriate sense of the limits 
of its own wisdom.45  The Court might feel strongly, based on its own 
moral reasoning, that the juvenile death penalty is immoral but be 
unwilling to override democratic processes unless it finds its intuitions 
shared by a large majority of respected legislators and jurists.  This 
majority does not exist, of course, until the foreign jurisdictions are 
counted.  Foreign practice thus “persuades” the Court, but it is persua-
sion of a particular kind.  The Court is not persuaded by new ration-
ales, but rather by the mere fact that foreign jurisdictions take a par-
ticular view.46  It has not “learned” anything from looking abroad 
other than to find out that others agree with what the Court already 
believed.  It is deferring to numbers, not reasons. 
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 42 See O’Connor, 2003 Remarks, supra note 24, at 2 (asserting that foreign citation “will create 
that all-important good impression,” and noting that “when U.S. courts are seen to be cognizant of 
other judicial systems, our ability to act as a rule-of-law model for other nations will be en-
hanced”); Tim Wu, Foreign Exchange: Should the Supreme Court Care What Other Countries 
Think?, SLATE, Apr. 9, 2004, http://slate.msn.com/id/2098559 (“Judges are not unlike rappers and 
bloggers: They like to pay their respects.”).  Justice Breyer acknowledged this function in his re-
marks at American University.  See Scalia & Breyer, supra note 9, at 7. 
 43 See, e.g., Kenneth Anderson, Foreign Law and the U.S. Constitution, POL’Y REV., June–
July 2005, at 33, 34 (arguing that Roper “puts paid to the conceit that this is all just a bit of fluff”); 
Ken I. Kersch, Multilateralism Comes to the Courts, PUB. INT., Winter 2004, at 3, 4–5 (discussing 
extrajudicial efforts by several Justices to promote comparative analysis). 
 44 Cf. Charles Fried, Scholars and Judges: Reason and Power, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
807, 818–21 (2000) (suggesting that citations to comparative materials should be viewed — and 
debated — as proposals to expand the canon of authoritative constitutional materials). 
 45 Cf. Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France 1790, in 8 THE WRITINGS 
AND SPEECHES OF EDMUND BURKE 53, 138 (L.G. Mitchell ed., 1989) (“We are afraid to put 
men to live and trade each on his own private stock of reason; because we suspect that this stock 
in each man is small, and that the individuals would do better to avail themselves of the general 
bank and capital of nations, and of ages.”). 
 46 Cf. RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW, supra note 21, at 21–22 (discussing the authoritative 
aspects of advice). 
156 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 119:148  
The crucial point is that, in this analysis, foreign practice carries 
weight that is independent of the underlying reasons for that practice.  
The Court thus chooses to treat foreign law as authoritative in Joseph 
Raz’s sense: It treats the mere fact that foreign jurisdictions condemn 
the juvenile death penalty as a reason to condemn that practice in the 
United States.47  Foreign practice is not the only reason, of course, and 
it remains to be seen what the internationalist Justices will do in a case 
about, say, hate speech or libel law when international authorities 
point in an opposite direction from their own views about domestic 
law.48  But an honest Court would have to admit that it is according 
some degree of authoritative weight to foreign practice. 
C.  Judicial Networks and Indirect Normative Influence 
All this talk about numerators, denominators, and persuasive force 
requires a certain suspension of disbelief: We must accept the Court’s 
assertions that the weight of practice or the arguments of foreign judi-
cial opinions actually matter for purposes of decision, and suspend our 
suspicion that what is really driving cases like Roper is the Justices’ 
own moral predilections.  But what if we open the door, at least a bit, 
to that suspicion?  Even if we think that the Court is just imposing its 
own moral preferences through the Eighth Amendment, we should not 
necessarily dismiss the foreign law issue as a red herring.  Rather, I 
suspect that foreign practices and jurists play an important role in in-
fluencing our Justices’ moral predilections through what Anne-Marie 
Slaughter has described as “global networks” of judges.49 
Professor Slaughter has noted that meetings and exchanges be-
tween the judiciaries of various nations — including ours — have be-
come increasingly institutionalized in recent years.  These exchanges 
not only “serve to educate and to cross-fertilize” by “broaden[ing] the 
perspectives of the participating judges,” but also “socialize their 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 47 See RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM, supra note 21, at 35 (observing that 
“[a]uthoritative utterances” have “no direct connection between the reason and the action for 
which it is a reason” but instead “[t]he reason is in the apparently ‘extraneous’ fact that someone 
in authority has said so”).  I do not say that the Court is necessarily preferring foreign authorities 
to the American Constitution; rather, the Court interprets the Eighth Amendment as authorizing 
it to accord authoritative weight to external sources.  That interpretation is hardly inevitable, and 
it must be defended. 
 48 See generally Roger P. Alford, Misusing International Sources To Interpret the Constitution, 
98 AM. J. INT’L L. 57, 67–69 (2004) (identifying several areas where foreign practice is likely to 
cut against broad American notions of civil liberties).  Because foreign authorities are not neces-
sarily dispositive, they are not “preemptive” of other reasons in the sense that Professor Raz’s ac-
count generally demands.  See RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM, supra note 21, at 46.  But 
neither is prior precedent, which may be overruled for sufficiently good reasons.  We generally 
have little trouble recognizing precedent as “authority” in our common sense of the term. 
 49 See ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 65–103 (2004). 
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members as participants in a common global judicial enterprise.”50  
The result “is an increasingly global constitutional jurisprudence, in 
which courts are referring to each other’s decisions on issues ranging 
from free speech to privacy rights to the death penalty.”51  In effect, 
Slaughter’s theory of global judicial networks provides a relatively so-
phisticated institutional account to bolster the perception — common 
in grumpier conservative circles — that Justice Kennedy has been 
brainwashed on his summer trips to Europe.52 
The existence — perceived or real — of a moral “consensus” among 
the Justices’ peers may well influence not only the doctrinal analysis 
discussed in the last section, but also the formation of the Justices’ un-
derlying preferences.  Interactions between legal elites on a global scale 
make it increasingly likely that the views of lawyers and jurists abroad 
will form part of the reference set for our own Justices as they formu-
late their own moral views.53  Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks have 
thus identified “acculturation” as a key mechanism by which interna-
tional norms influence domestic actors.54  I am neither a psychologist 
nor a sociologist, and it would be extremely difficult for even someone 
trained in those fields to evaluate the effects of such dynamics on indi-
vidual judges with respect to particular issues.  But a substantial em-
pirical literature supports the general phenomenon of acculturation,55 
and it seems plausible to speculate that, at least on an issue like the 
juvenile death penalty on which the United States is a clear outlier, the 
existence of a global consensus may exert sociological as well as doc-
trinal pressure.  Notably, such influence would take approximately  
the same form in each mode: The inclusion of foreign practices and  
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 50 Id. at 99; see also Sandra Day O’Connor, Keynote Address, 96 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 
348, 352 (2002) (urging “travel to foreign nations and a dialogue with foreign jurists and lawyers”). 
 51 SLAUGHTER, supra note 49, at 66; see also Jeffrey Toobin, Swing Shift: How Anthony Ken-
nedy’s Passion for Foreign Law Could Change the Supreme Court, THE NEW YORKER, Sept. 12, 
2005, at 42, 48 (reporting, based on interviews with Justice Kennedy, that he “regards the use of 
foreign law by the Supreme Court as an inevitable effect of an increasingly interconnected 
world”). 
 52 See Toobin, supra note 51, at 44, 50 (reporting the views of Representatives Steve King and 
Tom Feeney).  For a more approving but otherwise similar view, see Michael C. Dorf, The Hidden 
International Influence in the Supreme Court Decision Barring Executions of the Mentally Re-
tarded, WRIT, June 26, 2002, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20020626.html, which discusses 
the “Strasbourg Effect” of attendance by several American Justices at conferences with their 
counterparts on the European Court of Human Rights. 
 53 See Toobin, supra note 51, at 48 (quoting Justice Kennedy’s observation that as a result of 
“informal exchanges, like in Salzburg[,] . . . [y]ou can’t help but be influenced by what you see and 
hear”).  See generally SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, WHO ARE WE? THE CHALLENGES TO 
AMERICA’S NATIONAL IDENTITY 264–73 (2004) (discussing the “[d]enationalization” of Ameri-
can elites, including internationally oriented lawyers). 
 54 See Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How To Influence States: Socialization and Interna-
tional Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621, 638–56 (2004). 
 55 See id. at 640–41 (collecting studies). 
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opinions reinforces — or even creates — the impression that U.S. prac-
tice is aberrant and improper. 
This is not the place for a comprehensive discussion of judicial so-
cialization.  The important point is that debates about that form of in-
fluence and the more doctrinal inclusion of foreign jurisdictions in the 
practice denominator are (or ought to be) linked in at least three 
senses.  First, Professors Goodman and Jinks have shown that accul-
turation is, like counting noses, distinct from persuasion: What counts 
is not the reasons underlying the consensus of one’s peers, but simply 
the fact that they have adopted a particular view.56  Second, the pro-
priety of both nose-counting influence and socialization may turn on 
whether the moral values embodied in a constitutional norm are 
thought to be universal or particular: If the Eighth Amendment’s 
“standards of decency” are unique to America, then it is appropriate 
neither to count foreign jurisdictions when considering practice nor to 
allow oneself to be influenced by foreign peers.  Finally, debating the 
doctrinal denominator problem may itself influence the process of so-
cialization.  If American courts were to conclude that only domestic 
practice is relevant, then their judges might feel pressure to distinguish 
American mores concerning punishment from the views they encoun-
ter on their European sabbaticals. 
Some degree of socialization may be inevitable as courts and judges 
interact across borders.  But like everything else in this debate, it will 
be less objectionable to the extent that judges candidly pin down and 
defend the factors influencing their moral judgments.  To see clearly 
how much foreign law may matter, it may help to turn to an area 
where the denominator problem has always been at the forefront of 
doctrinal controversy. 
D.  The Denominator Problem in Obscenity Law 
The foreign law question is hardly the only instance of a “denomi-
nator problem” in American constitutional law.  The most sustained 
consideration of this sort of question has occurred in obscenity cases, 
which have always required that the offensiveness of a particular work 
be measured against some “community standard.”  Judge Learned 
Hand’s seminal articulation of the community standards test made 
clear that it is predicated on evolving notions of decency similar to 
those at issue in Eighth Amendment cases.  Judge Hand opined that 
“the word ‘obscene’ . . . indicate[s] the present critical point in the 
compromise between candor and shame at which the community may 
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 56 See id. at 643 (“Acculturation occurs not as a result of the content of the relevant rule or 
norm but rather as a function of social structure — the relations between individual actors and 
some reference group.”). 
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have arrived here and now . . . . [T]he vague subject-matter is left to 
the gradual development of general notions about what is decent.”57 
The original version of the denominator problem in obscenity law 
concerned what sorts of persons should be included in the relevant 
community.  English law evaluated putatively obscene material by its 
effect on the most sensitive or susceptible persons, but the U.S. Su-
preme Court rejected that approach in Roth v. United States58 as “un-
constitutionally restrictive of the freedoms of speech and press.”  In-
stead, courts were to ask “whether to the average person, applying 
contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the mate-
rial taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest.”59  Since those early 
cases, questions about who should be included in the community have 
consistently remained important considerations.60 
Most controversy, however, has concerned the proper geographic 
scope of the relevant community.  In Jacobellis v. Ohio,61 Justice Bren-
nan wrote, “the constitutional status of an allegedly obscene work 
must be determined on the basis of a national standard.  It is, after all, 
a national Constitution we are expounding.”  A majority of the Court 
squarely rejected that position, however, in Miller v. California.62  In 
that case, Chief Justice Burger observed that while “fundamental First 
Amendment limitations . . . do not vary from community to commu-
nity, . . . this does not mean that there are, or should or can be, fixed, 
uniform national standards of precisely what appeals to the ‘prurient 
interest’ or is ‘patently offensive.’”63  As a result, “[i]t is neither realis-
tic nor constitutionally sound to read the First Amendment as requir-
ing that the people of Maine or Mississippi accept public depiction of 
conduct found tolerable in Las Vegas, or New York City.”64  Later 
cases accorded flexibility to the States as to whether the precise stan-
dard should be local, statewide, or even ambiguous.  As Justice 
Rehnquist wrote in Jenkins v. Georgia,65 “[a] State may choose to  
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 57 United States v. Kennerley, 209 F. 119, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1913). 
 58 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957).  For the English rule, which had been adopted in some American 
jurisdictions, see The Queen v. Hicklin, (1868) 3 L.R.Q.B. 360. 
 59 Roth, 354 U.S. at 489. 
 60 See, e.g., Pinkus v. United States, 436 U.S. 293, 297–98 (1978) (reversing a federal obscenity 
conviction because the jury was instructed to include children as part of the relevant “commu-
nity”); Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 508 (1966) (holding that, for some materials, the rele-
vant community may be confined to “a clearly defined deviant sexual group”). 
 61 378 U.S. 184, 195 (1964) (plurality opinion) (footnote omitted). 
 62 413 U.S. 15, 30–34 (1973). 
 63 Id. at 30. 
 64 Id. at 32. 
 65 418 U.S. 153, 157 (1974); see also Patrick T. Egan, Note, Virtual Community Standards: 
Should Obscenity Law Recognize the Contemporary Community Standard of Cyberspace?, 30 
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 117, 144 (1996) (noting that “state courts have applied standards using the 
state, county, city, and local community as the basis for community size” (footnotes omitted)). 
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define an obscenity offense in terms of ‘contemporary community stan-
dards’ . . . without further specification, . . . or it may choose to define 
the standards in more precise geographic terms.” 
The post-Miller cases have considered a number of subsidiary 
questions concerning the application of community standards in ob-
scenity cases.66  In each of these cases, questions concerning whether a 
court may look to community practices, how those practices are to be 
defined, and what practices are relevant took center stage.  More fun-
damentally, the obscenity cases have featured important debates about 
whether a coherent community standard can even be identified at a 
broad level of generality.  Chief Justice Burger argued in Miller that 
“our Nation is simply too big and too diverse for this Court to rea-
sonably expect that . . . standards could be articulated for all 50 States 
in a single formulation, even assuming the prerequisite consensus ex-
ists.”67  Justice Stevens suggested in Smith v. United States68 that 
“[t]he most significant reasons for the failure to define a national stan-
dard for obscenity apply with equal force to the use of local stan-
dards,” and he worried that because “the geographic boundaries of the 
relevant community are not easily defined,” they may be “subject to 
elastic adjustment to suit the needs of the prosecutor.”  Notwithstand-
ing their different conclusions, both Justices agreed that in order to 
employ any community standard, one must first consider whether  
a coherent consensus can be identified within the proposed frame of  
reference.69 
My point here is simple: No one is confused in these obscenity cases 
about whether the size of the denominator matters.  Of course it does, 
and it may affect not only the analysis but also the result.  Convictions 
can be reversed because the jury was instructed to consider a frame of 
relevant practice that was either too large or too small.  And because 
the Justices are clear about the importance of the choice, their opinions 
feature a forthright debate about whether coherent community  
standards can exist at a given level of generality and which frame of  
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 66 See, e.g., Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497 (1987) (restricting consideration of community stan-
dards to certain aspects of the Miller test); Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291 (1977) (consider-
ing whether, for purposes of a federal obscenity prosecution, a particular state could define its 
own community standards as a matter of positive law); Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 
(1974) (featuring a sharp debate over whether instructing the jury to consider a national rather 
than a more narrow community was reversible error). 
 67 Miller, 413 U.S. at 30. 
 68 431 U.S. 291, 313, 314–15 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 69 The community standards debate has, if anything, intensified now that the primary battle-
ground of obscenity law has moved to the Internet.  See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002) 
(considering whether Congress’s use of Miller’s non-national community standard to identify in-
decent material on the Internet as “harmful to minors” was unconstitutional on its face). 
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reference best suits the constitutional command that is being enforced.  
That is the sort of debate that we need to have about foreign law. 
II.  KEEPING THE DENOMINATOR SMALL 
The size of the denominator matters in constitutional cases, and 
therefore the Court’s inclusion of foreign jurisdictions in that denomi-
nator matters as well.  Whether one ultimately concludes that domestic 
practices should be measured against a national or an international 
“consensus,” the Court’s foreign citations should not be defended by 
downplaying their significance.  In this Part, I sketch some arguments 
for keeping the denominator relatively small.  Space will not permit 
detailed argument on these points, but they may suggest productive 
lines for future inquiry. 
A.  Arguments from Democracy 
Whether courts consult foreign law for merely persuasive purposes 
or for purposes of establishing a broader “consensus,” such consulta-
tion presupposes that the foreign jurisdictions considered are, in some 
relevant way, similar to our own.  Yet when we look to “other nations 
that share our Anglo-American heritage, and . . . the leading members 
of the Western European community,”70 we see divergence rather than 
convergence on many aspects of values and political culture.71  These 
divergences tend to undermine, in a variety of ways, our national de-
mocratic commitments. 
Jed Rubenfeld has recently demonstrated that Americans and 
Europeans subscribe, for the most part, to fundamentally different 
conceptions of constitutionalism.  American law grounds constitutional 
rights in popular sovereignty, while European constitutionalism, and 
the international rhetoric of human rights, “is based on . . . universal 
rights and principles that derive their authority from sources outside of 
or prior to national democratic processes.”72  European legal rules gov-
erning the death penalty, for instance, do not have the same relation to 
popular opinion or “norms of decency” that American rules have; in 
fact, polls suggest that European nations abolished the death penalty 
notwithstanding broad popular support for the practice.73  The Court’s 
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 70 Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830 (1988) (plurality opinion). 
 71 See generally ROBERT KAGAN, OF PARADISE AND POWER: AMERICA AND EUROPE IN 
THE NEW WORLD ORDER (2003); GEORGE WEIGEL, THE CUBE AND THE CATHEDRAL: 
EUROPE, AMERICA, AND POLITICS WITHOUT GOD (2005). 
 72 Jed Rubenfeld, Unilateralism and Constitutionalism, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1971, 1999 (2004). 
 73 See Joshua Micah Marshall, Death in Venice: The European Death-Penalty Myth, NEW 
REPUBLIC, July 31, 2000, at 12, 12; Andrew Moravcsik, The New Abolitionism: Why Does the 
U.S. Practice the Death Penalty While Europe Does Not?, PUBLICATIONS (Council for Eur. 
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Eighth Amendment jurisprudence is meant to ground constitutional 
doctrine in evolving democratic commitments, but foreign conceptions 
of rights are not necessarily democratic in the same sense that ours are. 
We likewise lack a common demos in which different nations can 
engage in democratic debate over the morality of a given practice.  
Europeans have grappled with whether constitutionalism can flourish 
at a supranational level of governance that lacks a meaningful democ-
ratic community, or whether the member states of the EU, with their 
well-developed national communities, must remain the primary sites 
for the articulation and maintenance of constitutional values.74  This 
“No Demos” problem becomes even more pronounced at the interna-
tional level; as Michael Ramsey has observed, “terms like ‘interna-
tional opinion’ or opinions of ‘humankind’ or the ‘world community’ 
. . . disguise[] the fact that there is no unified ‘world community’ with 
a simple and easily accessible opinion to be had for the asking.”75  The 
problem is not simply a lack of a common discourse but also the ab-
sence of supranational institutions that, through the legitimating force 
of representation and deliberation, could transform the Court’s nose 
counting into a meaningful democratic conclusion.76 
Finally, the divergence between European nations and our own, 
particularly on issues associated with capital punishment, may simply 
be too great to sustain the basic commonality of values necessary to 
identify “‘the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of 
a maturing society.’”77  The relatively trivial sentence imposed by a 
German court on a man found to have conspired in the September 11 
attacks, for instance, suggests a fundamental disparity in notions of 
appropriate punishment.78  And European laws on the death penalty 
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Studies at Columbia Univ., New York, N.Y.), Sept. 2001, http://www.columbia.edu/cu/ces/pub/ 
Moravcsik_sep01.html. 
 74 See, e.g., Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. 12, 1993, 
89 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 155 (F.R.G.), translated in [1994] 1 
C.M.L.R. 57, 89–91 (upholding the Maastricht treaty against constitutional challenge, but assert-
ing the final authority of the German Constitutional Court to judge the validity of acts of EU in-
stitutions due to the lack of a meaningful democratic community at the European level); J.H.H. 
Weiler, Does Europe Need a Constitution? Demos, Telos and the German Maastricht Decision, 1 
EUR. L.J. 219 (1995) (discussing the “No Demos” argument). 
 75 Michael D. Ramsey, International Materials and Domestic Rights: Reflections on Atkins 
and Lawrence, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 69, 79 (2004). 
 76 See generally WALDRON, supra note 21, at 86 (“[F]air representation of diversity 
. . . requires attention to the conditions under which diverse representatives can deliberate to-
gether coherently.”). 
 77 Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1190 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality  
opinion)). 
 78 In 2003, a German court convicted Mounir Motassadeq of over 3000 counts of accessory to 
murder as a conspirator in the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center.  Motassadeq was 
sentenced to fifteen years in prison, which was the maximum allowed under German law.  See 
Craig Whitlock, Friend of 9/11 Hijackers Convicted in Germany, WASH. POST, Aug. 20, 2005, at 
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derive from a backlash against historical misuse of the penalty by 
autocratic regimes and, perhaps, the peculiar dynamics of European 
integration79 — neither of which has much purchase in the United 
States.  These divergences increase the utility of foreign references for 
advocates: Opponents of the death penalty who have striven in vain to 
persuade their fellow Americans to abandon the measure will find 
more support by extending their sphere of argument to take in foreign 
opinions and practices.80  Appeals to foreign law are thus a symptom 
not of convergence of values at the international level but rather of di-
vergence at the national level.  As American political life becomes in-
creasingly polarized, it is not surprising that partisans of one view or 
another find that they have more in common with groups outside the 
domestic society.81  In any event, it is surely odd to take worldwide 
condemnation of U.S. practice, as the Roper Court did, as confirmation 
that our own values have evolved. 
B.  Arguments from Constitutional Structure 
The Court’s inclusion of foreign jurisdictions in its “consensus” cal-
culus alters the ordinary allocation of power between institutions in 
our constitutional structure.  The political branches — the Executive 
and Congress — are generally the primary actors in foreign affairs.82  
Yet importing foreign law into the domestic legal system through con-
stitutional interpretation circumvents the institutional mechanisms by 
which the political branches ordinarily control the interaction between 
the domestic and the foreign.  The sense that the President and Con-
gress have lost some control over American accession to international 
norms may have contributed to the political outrage that followed the 
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A12 (noting that the German courts overturned the conviction and sentenced Motassadeq to 
seven years on retrial).  A fifteen-year maximum for over 3000 deaths can only bespeak an ex-
traordinary faith in rehabilitation as a purpose of punishment — a faith that American law does 
not seem to share with respect to most homicides. 
 79 See Stephen J. Silvia & Aaron Beers Sampson, The New Abolitionism: American or Euro-
pean Exceptionalism Regarding the Death Penalty?, PUBLICATIONS (Council for Eur. Studies at 
Columbia Univ., New York, N.Y.), Jan. 2002, http://www.columbia.edu/cu/ces/pub/Silvia-
Sampson_jan02.html (noting that the EU imposed abolition as a condition on states seeking to 
enter the Union). 
 80 See, e.g., Paul L. Hoffman, The “Blank Stare Phenomenon”: Proving Customary Interna-
tional Law in U.S. Courts, 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 181, 181 (1995/1996) (noting, as a practic-
ing civil rights lawyer, “[t]he attraction of international human rights law to me is simple: [it] 
promises more for my clients than U.S. domestic legal standards in many instances”). 
 81 See, e.g., Caryle Murphy, Nigeria’s Top Anglican Proposes U.S. Parishes, WASH. POST, Oct. 
6, 2004, at A16 (reporting that, in the wake of the U.S. Episcopal Church’s ordination of an 
openly gay bishop, “three traditionalist parishes in the Diocese of Los Angeles announced that 
they were aligning with the Anglican Church of Uganda”). 
 82 See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 412 (1964). 
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Court’s citation of foreign sources in cases like Roper, Atkins, and 
Lawrence.83 
One way to illustrate this problem is to take seriously the notion 
that the judgments of courts around the world on common questions 
of human rights amount to customary international law.  Opponents of 
the juvenile death penalty have long argued that it offends customary 
norms that bind the United States on the international plane.84  But 
even if such norms would trump state law capital punishment re-
gimes,85 Congress could override such norms simply by enacting a 
statute permitting the practice.  And while the matter is not quite as 
clear, the Executive would most likely have similar authority to nullify 
any binding effect that such customary norms would have within the 
domestic legal system. 
A decision like Roper, however, uses exactly the same foreign legal 
materials — the decisions of foreign jurisdictions to proscribe the ju-
venile death penalty — but employs them in such a way as to foreclose 
any ability of the political branches to articulate a different view.  In-
corporation of foreign practice into constitutional law thus eliminates 
the political branches’ usual prerogative to dissent from the formation 
of customary norms or to depart from those norms once they have de-
veloped.  The Roper Court thus decided that it — not the President, 
and not the Congress — would control the way in which the American 
legal system would respond to developments in international law. 
The interference with political branch authority in Roper was 
much more blatant than in the example just sketched.  The national 
political branches had not, in fact, sat passively by as the rest of the 
world staked out positions on the juvenile death penalty.  The Court, 
however, gave these political branch decisions the back of the hand.  
The majority emphasized Article 37 of the United Nations Convention 
on the Rights of the Child, which prohibits the juvenile death penalty, 
notwithstanding that the United States has never ratified this treaty.86  
The majority likewise cited a parallel prohibition in the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,87 notwithstanding that the 
United States’s ratification of the treaty included a reservation denying 
the binding force of that particular point.88  The national political 
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 83 See, e.g., H.R. Res. 568, 108th Cong. (2004) (“[I]nappropriate judicial reliance on foreign 
judgments, laws, or pronouncements threatens . . . the separation of powers and the President’s 
and the Senate’s treaty-making authority . . . .”). 
 84 See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, Federalism, State Authority, and the Preemptive Power of Interna-
tional Law, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 295, 325–26. 
 85 A very dubious proposition.  See Ernest A. Young, Sorting Out the Debate over Customary 
International Law, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 365, 382–83, 474–77 (2002). 
 86 See Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1199. 
 87 Adopted Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368. 
 88 Roper, 125.S. Ct..at 1194, 1199. 
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branches had plainly determined that the world’s condemnation 
should not affect our own domestic law.  But the Court adopted pre-
cisely the opposite course. 
A second set of structural imbalances results from the use of foreign 
law to impose a uniform “consensus” position.  Prior to Roper, deci-
sions about the juvenile death penalty were left to two sets of decen-
tralized decisionmakers: state legislatures, which determined whether 
to permit capital punishment as an option for sentencing offenders un-
der the age of eighteen, and juries, which determined whether to im-
pose the death penalty in individual cases.  The effect of finding a 
“consensus” at the national or international level is to displace state-
by-state diversity on the question.  As voices on both Left and Right 
are recognizing, however, the best solution to our increasingly divisive 
“culture wars” may be to let each state define its own course on the 
“hot-button” issues of the day.89  Indeed, the very notion of “consensus” 
as a basis for imposing constitutional restrictions on the States is an 
odd one.  Our system generally requires a series of explicit political 
acts, rather than simply a confluence of opinion, to impose binding na-
tional or international norms on the States.90 
States retaining the juvenile death penalty relied upon an even 
more decentralized decisionmaker: the jury in each case.  The Court 
stressed that even states that had kept the penalty as a formal matter 
actually imposed it only in a very small number of cases.91  This evi-
dence is perfectly consistent with a “consensus” view that juveniles 
ought generally not receive the death penalty, but also that juries 
should retain the authority to impose it in extraordinary circumstances.  
That view would also respect the central importance of the jury in our 
constitutional tradition92 — an emphasis not shared by most of the 
foreign jurisdictions to which the Court referred.93  It is unsurprising 
that jurisdictions without a strong tradition of case-by-case application 
of moral norms by juries would approach questions like the juvenile 
death penalty in a more categorical way. 
C.  Arguments from Institutional Competence 
Finally, any approach to constitutional interpretation should be 
evaluated in terms of its decision costs (the time, effort, and expense 
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 89 See, e.g., David J. Barron, Reclaiming Federalism, DISSENT, Spring 2005, at 64, 64. 
 90 See, e.g., Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. 
REV. 1321 (2001). 
 91 See Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1192. 
 92 See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 83–98 (1998). 
 93 See, e.g., Douglas G. Smith, Structural and Functional Aspects of the Jury: Comparative 
Analysis and Proposals for Reform, 48 ALA. L. REV. 441, 453–67 (1997) (describing alternatives to 
the jury in civil law systems). 
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involved in deciding cases in a particular way) and its error costs (the 
likelihood of making mistakes by pursuing a particular method).  Both 
kinds of costs seem likely to be high for American courts dealing with 
foreign materials, given language and cultural barriers and most 
American lawyers’ lack of training in comparative analysis.94  As Pro-
fessor Ramsey’s analysis of the briefs and opinions in Atkins and Law-
rence demonstrates, neither advocates nor judges have yet invested the 
resources necessary to bring comparative analysis up to the standards 
of rigor that we demand of arguments grounded in domestic law.95 
Consider, for example, Justice Breyer’s argument in Printz v. 
United States96 that “commandeering” state officials to enforce federal 
law poses no threat to federalism because German federal laws are 
implemented by officials of the Länder and European Union directives 
are implemented by officials of the member states.  Daniel Halberstam 
has demonstrated that Justice Breyer’s discussion overlooked critical 
differences in institutional context such that commandeering might ac-
tually enhance decentralized autonomy in Europe while undermining 
it in the United States.97  Even in a relatively straightforward case of 
factual influence like Printz, then, the error costs (or the decision costs 
necessary to avoid them) may be unacceptably high. 
To be sure, these competence concerns parallel arguments against 
the use of history in originalist constitutional interpretation.  Although 
reliance on history has increased research burdens on lawyers and 
courts, and courts surely get the history wrong in some cases,98 I think 
it fair to say that the courts have proved reasonably capable of making 
sense of historical arguments.  Moreover, because law engages virtually 
the full range of human activity, courts must inevitably dabble in a 
wide range of disciplines in which they may lack training or expertise 
— for example, economics in antitrust cases, science and engineering 
in patent cases, psychology in criminal cases.  One should not  
overstate the disadvantages confronting courts in assessing  
arguments predicated on a particular discipline.  At the same time, the  
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 94 When House Majority Leader Tom DeLay recently attacked Justice Kennedy for doing his 
own research into international law on the Internet, DeLay Criticizes Justice Kennedy, L.A. 
TIMES, Apr. 20, 2005, at A28, for example, he may have been voicing plausible concerns about 
the casual and inexpert ways in which the Court currently practices comparative law.  Many of 
the opinions read as if a law clerk had been deputized for an afternoon to find useful citations. 
 95 See Ramsey, supra note 75, at 72–80; see also Alford, supra note 48, at 64–67 (detailing the 
Court’s “haphazard” use of foreign sources). 
 96 521 U.S. 898, 976–77 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 97 See Daniel Halberstam, Comparative Federalism and the Issue of Commandeering, in THE 
FEDERAL VISION 213, 249–51 (Kalypso Nicolaidis & Robert Howse eds., 2001). 
 98 Compare Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 100–85 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting) (incur-
ring eighty-five pages’ worth of decision costs to interpret the historical background of state sov-
ereign immunity), with id. at 44–76 (majority opinion) (doing considerably less work but, not sur-
prisingly, getting the history wrong). 
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incremental burdens associated with comparative legal inquiry need to 
be assessed against the benefits to be gained, and we may reasonably 
insist that the Court be considerably more careful, articulate, and thor-
ough when it cites foreign law than it has been to date.99 
A third category of costs — call them “indeterminacy costs” — 
arises because there are so many foreign jurisdictions to choose from 
and because the sources of international law (particularly the custom-
ary kind) are often so ambiguous that the whole enterprise is pro-
foundly manipulable.100  We might well compare foreign citation to the 
classic quip about legislative history: it is like “looking over a crowd 
and picking out your friends.”101  This additional layer of indetermi-
nacy is particularly troubling for Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, in 
which the practice component of the analysis is supposed to act as 
some constraint upon the other component, which simply is the per-
sonal moral judgments of the Justices.  Such obvious manipulability 
may, in turn, undermine the legitimacy of the Court’s decisions. 
CONCLUSION 
References to foreign law in cases like Roper are not simply in-
nocuous attempts to “learn something” from the practices of foreign 
nations.  Rather, foreign law becomes part of the binding doctrinal 
analysis that generates the outcome of the case.  More specifically, the 
addition of foreign jurisdictions to the denominator of the Roper frac-
tion made the numerator — those American jurisdictions retaining the 
juvenile death penalty — seem small and aberrant.  It is disingenuous 
to deny that the foreign law component “matters” in these cases.  The 
decades-long clash over the appropriate size of the denominator in ob-
scenity cases ought to remind us of that fact. 
Acknowledging this reality is a necessary predicate to a mature de-
bate about foreign law’s place in our legal system.  I have suggested 
several reasons to prefer small denominators over large ones — that is, 
to confine the normative inquiry in “community standards” cases to 
the domestic community.  Whether or not those reasons ultimately 
prove persuasive, we cannot have an intelligent discussion about them 
until we recognize that the subject makes a difference. 
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